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Abstract
It is well established that processing information in relation to oneself (i.e., self-referencing) leads to better memory for that information
than processing that same information in relation to others (i.e., other-referencing). However, it is unknown whether self-referencing
also leads to more false memories than other-referencing does. In the current two experiments with European and East Asian samples,
we presented participants the Deese–Roediger–McDermott lists together with their own name or other people’s name (i.e., BTrump^ in
Experiment 1 and BLi Ming^ in Experiment 2). We found consistent results across the two experiments; that is, in the self-reference
condition, participants had higher true and false memory rates compared with those in the other-reference condition. Moreover, we
found that self-referencing did not exhibit superior mnemonic advantage in terms of net accuracy compared with other-referencing and
neutral conditions. These findings are discussed in terms of theoretical frameworks such as spreading activation theories and the fuzzy-
trace theory. We propose that our results reflect the adaptive nature of memory in the sense that cognitive processes that increase
mnemonic efficiency may also increase susceptibility to associative false memories.
Keywords Self-reference . False memory . Net accuracy . Spreading activation . Fuzzy-trace theory
The self plays an important role in memory (Conway, 2005;
Howe, 2014; Klein, 2012). It is well established that informa-
tion is better remembered when it is processed in relation to
the self than when it is processed in relation to other sources
(Symons & Johnson, 1997). For instance, judging words for
their personal relevance (BDoes this word describe you?^)
produces superior memory recall than does other-referencing
(BDoes this word describe Henry?^) or semantic encoding
(BDoes this word mean the same as XXX?; Kuiper &
Rogers, 1979; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). The superior
mnemonic effect for items encoded with respect to the self has
been termed as the self-reference effect (SRE) and has re-
ceived considerable empirical support. For instance, SRE
has been found in various age groups (from children to old
people; Cunningham, Brebner, Quinn, & Turk, 2014;
Gutchess, Kensinger, Yoon, & Schacter, 2007) as well as in
different cultures (Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007).
One of the proposed mechanisms underlying SRE is rela-
tional processing or organizational processing (Klein, 2012;
Klein & Loftus 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997). Relational
processing refers to the encoding of associations among items
in a list leading participants to think about the shared concept
or label (Klein, 2012; Klein & Loftus, 1988). For example,
when participants see the words sound and piano, the items
can be organized as concepts related to Bmusic.^ Another
example would be items sharing the same category, such as
dog and horse that can be both processed under the category
Banimal.^ Klein & Loftus, (1998) manipulated the relatedness
among items within a list and found that for weakly related
lists, category sorting (i.e., relational processing) produced
equivalent recall as self-referenced processing, suggesting re-
lational processing is one of the mechanisms underlying SRE.
In line with this, Sui and Humphreys (2015) have recently
proposed that self-reference increases the binding among dif-
ferent forms of information in memory. For instance, evidence
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shows that people not only remember the self-referenced stim-
uli better than other-referenced stimuli but also remember the
stimuli–self associations (e.g., an apple paired with one’s own
face) better than the stimuli–other associations (e.g., a cup
paired with other people’s face; Cunningham et al., 2014).
Leshikar and Duarte (2014) reported that both young and
old adults exhibited better relational memories for object–
scene bindings (e.g., saxophone–beach) in the self-reference
rather than the other-reference condition. According to Sui
and Humphreys, the self acts like a form of Bassociative glue^
in a memory network, and when self-representations are acti-
vated, they strengthen the binding among different stimuli in
relation to the self-representation, thus increasing retention for
experienced stimuli. Taken together, research so far has dem-
onstrated that relational processing among the list items or the
binding among stimuli may account for the mnemonic supe-
riority of self-referenced processing.
Interestingly, according to spreading activation theories of
false memory (e.g., activation association theory [AAT]:
Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; activation/
monitoring theory [AMT]: Roediger, Balota, & Watson,
2001a), relational processing or binding between items may
also contribute to the creation of false memories. False mem-
ories refer to memory for details or events that were not expe-
rienced. The Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm (DRM;
Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) is a typical ex-
perimental paradigm used to study false memories. Here, par-
ticipants study lists of associated words (e.g., sound, piano,
sing, radio, band, melody, horn, concert, instrument), and
during memory tests, participants oftentimes falsely recall or
recognize the presence of a nonpresented critical lure (i.e.,
music) that is associated with the list items. Studies with the
DRM paradigm show that increasing the associative strength
of a studied list (i.e., increasing relational processing) results
in higher levels of false memories (Gallo & Roediger, 2002;
Howe et al., 2009; for results showing that the associative
strength of a studied list is not the source of false-memory
effects, see Cann, McRae, & Katz, 2011). Following this line
of reasoning, enhancing relational processing using self-
referencing should not only make people better remember
what has been presented but should also enhance the suscep-
tibility to the DRM memory illusion compared with other-
referencing conditions. The current experiments were con-
ducted to examine this idea.
Spreading activation theories (e.g., Howe et al., 2009) sug-
gest that related concepts, such as the DRM list items, are
embedded within an associative network and that the presence
of an item (e.g., the word piano) activates a corresponding
concept (see also Otgaar, Muris, Howe, & Merckelbach,
2017). Most importantly, according to these theories, activa-
tion will automatically spread to Bnearby^ related concepts
(e.g., music) and the level of activation determines the rate
of recall/recognition (Anderson, 1983). The activation of
related but nonpresented concepts leads to false recollections
of nonpresented critical lures. As Fig. 1 shows, based on
mechanisms of false memory and SRE, when the DRM list
items are processed in relation to the self, the self may
strengthen the relatedness among the items as well as the
activation spreading to the critical lures, thus evoking more
false memories of the critical lures than when processing in-
formation related to others.
In addition to spreading activation theories, another theo-
retical account, fuzzy-trace theory (FTT; Brainerd & Reyna,
2002; Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008a), also predicts that the
self may increase false memory. According to FTT, when
encoding an item, verbatim traces and gist traces of the item
are stored in memory. Verbatim traces are item-specific fea-
tures (e.g., unique spelling of a studied word) that distinguish
one item from another. Gist traces are memory representations
of semantic and relational information (Brainerd & Reyna,
2005). Brainerd, Yang, Reyna, Howe, and Mills (2008b)
showed that relations between studied items and critical lures
are mostly semantic in the DRM paradigm. When a DRM list
including dog, cat, horse, and pig is presented, participants
may extract a gist such as animal that semantically relates to
all items (i.e., all items belong to animal). Hence, participants
may confuse animal with presented items and falsely recog-
nize it as presented since it shares gist (i.e., meanings, with
presented items). Thus, gist processing supports false memory
according to FTT (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002).
Of relevance here is that when self-reference facilitates the
semantic relatedness among DRM items, it actually facilitates
gist extraction according to FTT. Because gist traces support
false memory of critical lures, self-referencing may increase
false memory rates compared with other-referencing. FTT
elaborates the mechanism of how relational processing
Fig. 1 Hypothetical associative memory network when the self is
referenced, based on spreading activation theories (Howe et al., 2009;
Roediger et al., 2001a) and the mechanisms of SRE (Klein, 2012; Sui
& Humphreys, 2015). Blue circles represent DRM list items; yellow
circle represents the critical lure; solid lines represent relations among
items, and dashed arrows represent the strengthening effect to the
relatedness among items. (Color figure online)
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impacts false memory from a different perspective than asso-
ciative theories. That is, FTT proposes that relational process-
ing benefits false memory via encouraging gist processing,
whereas associative theories propose that relational processing
facilitates false memory via strengthening associations and
activations. Nonetheless, both theoretical approaches predict
that self-reference would increase false memory through in-
creasing relational processing.
Indeed, there is some evidence suggesting that self-
reference may be related to false memories. Rogers, Rogers,
and Kuiper (1979) found that false alarms for personal adjec-
tives increased as the degree of self-reference increased. Rosa
and Gutchess (2013) replicated this effect and extended this
effect to old adults (see also Rosa, Deason, Budson, &
Gutchess, 2015). They asked participants to rate adjectives
(e.g., cultured, sensible) for self-descriptiveness on a 9-point
scale and later measured their memories for the adjectives and
some adjective lures. The authors found that high self-
descriptiveness words led to higher false alarms than low
self-descriptiveness words did. One limitation with the afore-
mentioned research is that they did not compare the false
alarms between the self-reference and other-reference condi-
tions, but only examined the relationship between the degree
of self-reference and false alarms. Furthermore, previous stud-
ies did not use a well-established false memory paradigm
(e.g., the DRM paradigm) known to elicit false memories that
might be caused by similar mechanisms as the SRE. Choosing
such a paradigm would enable us to test the mechanisms un-
derlying SRE and false memories.
To date, no study has compared the false memories of self-
reference versus other-reference conditions, and no study has
examined the relationship between true and false memories
(i.e., net accuracy) generated from self-referential processing.
Net accuracy measures the overall memory accuracy, which is
the ratio of true memories to true memories plus false memo-
ries (Brainerd et al., 2008a). Because relational processing
may amplify both true memories and false memories, it is
unknown whether self-referencing would increase or even de-
crease the net accuracy (i.e., true memory to true memory plus
false memory) relative to other-referencing. However, since
self-referencing has been demonstrated to be a superior mem-
ory encoding strategy in previous literature, one would expect
that self-referencing should increase the overall memory ac-
curacy or net accuracy. The present study aimed to examine
self-referenced false and truememories as well as net accuracy
in the DRM paradigm.
The current experiments
We presented participants with DRM lists appearing together
with either their own name (self-referenced condition) or some
other people’s name (i.e., Trump; other-referenced condition).
During the study phase, participants were asked to remember
the words shown to them as well as with which source (self or
other) the words appeared together. After a filler task, they
were asked to recognize the words as presented or not in the
recognition phase. Based on previous research (e.g., Rogers et
al., 1979; Rosa & Gutchess, 2013) as well as relational pro-
cessing mechanism of SRE, we predicted that the self-
referenced condition would result in higher false recognition
rates of the critical lures than the other-referenced condition.
We also predicted that self-referencing would lead to the
highest true recognition rate of the studied items (i.e., the
SRE).
Importantly, previous research has shown that self-
reference can increase memory for perceptual details of the
studied items (Hamami, Serbun, & Gutchess, 2011; Leshikar,
Dulas, & Duarte, 2015; Serbun, Shih, & Gutchess, 2011).
Serbun et al. (2011) asked participants to encode objects in
relation to self or other and found that self-referenced objects
were remembered with more visual details. Leshikar et al.
(2015) used the remember/know (R/K) procedure to measure
recollection and familiarity of self-referential memories.
Recollection and familiarity are two subtypes of recognition
memory which can be calculated from R/K responses.
Recollection indicates remembering episodic details, while
familiarity refers to the feeling of recognizing an item but
the specific details (Yonelinas, 2002). Leshikar et al. (2015)
found that the self-referencing condition exhibited better rec-
ollection of studied items than semantic encoding (i.e., pro-
cessing the meaning of presented words). They also found
more phenomenologica l de ta i l s on the Memory
Characteristic Questionnaire (MCQ) measurements. It is un-
known whether self-referencing would also increase the phe-
nomenology of false memories. It might be that self-
referencing impacts familiarity of falsely recalled items, as
Rosa and Gutchess (2013) suggested. However, it is also pos-
sible that self-referencing impacts true and false memories in a
similar way by increasing recollection, as they share the same
activation network. We used the R/K judgment procedure
(Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995) in the recogni-
tion phase to examine the recollection and familiarity of crit-




With an estimation of medium effect size (d = 0.5; Symons &
Johnson, 1997) and power of 0.8, a priori power analysis
using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner,
2007) showed that 34 participants were needed. Thirty-nine
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participants from Maastricht University, The Netherlands,
were tested. The sample consisted of eight males and 31 fe-
males (Mage = 21.6, SD = 2.29, range: 18–31 years). All par-
ticipants were fluent in English. The experiment was approved
by the ethical board of Faculty of Psychology and
Neuroscience, Maastricht University.
Materials
Eighteen DRM word lists with 12 words per list were used.
The lists have been used in previous work as well (e.g., Howe,
Garner, & Patel, 2013). DRM lists were pseudorandomly
assigned to the self-reference (six lists, mean BAS = 0.26,
SD = .13), other-reference (six lists, Mean BAS = 0.26, SD
= .12), and control conditions (six lists, mean BAS = 0.26, SD
= .10), with the backward association strength (BAS) matched
across three conditions, F(2, 16) = 0.006, p = .995. Besides
controlling the BAS across conditions, we switched the lists in
the self-reference and other-reference conditions for half of the
participants (n = 19) to eliminate any list effects. The recog-
nition list included 18 critical lures (one critical lure per list),
36 studied items, and 36 unrelated new items. The studied
items were from the third and 10th position of each list.
Design and procedure
The experiment used a 3 (reference: self vs. other vs. neutral)
× 2 (memory type: true vs. false) within-subjects design. All
participants were tested individually in a quiet and isolated
room. The experiment was programmed using Visual Basic.
In the study phase, participants first were asked to fill in
some information including their own name (the name that
they were most frequently referred to). Then the DRM words
appeared one by one together with either their own name (self-
reference condition) or the name BTrump^ (other-reference
condition), or the DRM words appeared alone (neutral condi-
tion). BTrump^ was used in the other-reference condition as it
was a very familiar name due to the American election at the
time of our data collection. Participants were asked to remem-
ber the words and to which source they appeared together with
(self, Trump, or alone). The DRM words were shown list by
list, and the items within a list appeared with the same source
(see Fig. 2). All lists were presented in English as our previous
work showed that samples fromMaastricht University did not
differ from native English speakers in terms of DRM false
recognition rates (Wang, Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, &
Merckelbach, 2017). The experiment was separated in six
blocks with each block containing three BAS matched lists
(a self-referenced list, an other-referenced list, and a control
list). The sequence of the lists within a block was randomized.
After the study phase, participants performed a filler task
(playing the BBejeweled^ game) for around 5 min. Then, their
memories were tested using a recognition task. Words were
shown at the center of the screen, and participants responded
by clicking the BRemember,^ BKnow,^ or BNew^ button.
Participants received the following R/K instructions adapted
from previous research (see Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas &
Jacoby, 1995):
BIn the next task, words will be shown at the center of the
screen. Some words were presented in the previous
phase and some were not. Your task is to decide whether
the words are old (i.e., presented words) or new (i.e., not
presented).
If it is a new word, click the BNew^ button. If it is an old
word: When you clearly remember that the item was
presented (i.e., you can recall specific information such
as size, font, etc.), click the BRemember^ button; when
you know the item was presented but you cannot recall
specific details, click the BKnow^ button.^ Three exam-




BRemember^ and BKnow^ responses were combined together
when calculating the overall Bold^ recognition response rate.
False memory was defined as falsely recognizing a critical
lure as old. The mean false alarm rate of unrelated items was
19.66% (95% CI [14%, 25%]), and it was statistically lower
than false recognition rates of critical lures in any condition
(ps < .001), showing a typical false memory effect.
A 3 (reference: self vs. other vs. neutral) × 2 (memory type:
true vs. false) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on
Fig. 2 Illustration of one block in the study phase (BSelf^ stands for
participant’s own name). Bed, Short and Truck are representative words
from different lists. Each word pair was presented for 1,500 ms with 500-
ms interstimulus interval
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recognition rates. We found a statistically significant main
effect of reference, F(2, 76) = 6.77, p = .002, partial η2 =
0.15. Pair-wise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections indi-
cated that the self-reference condition had higher true and
false recognition rates than the other-reference condition did
(p < .001), and the neutral condition did not differ from the
other-reference condition (p > .80). There was no statistically
significant main effect of memory type, F(2, 76) = 0.22, p =
.65, indicating equivalent level of true memories and false
memories were recognized. No statistically significant inter-
action effect between reference and memory type was found,
F(2, 76) = 0.21, p = .81, suggesting that the SRE is similar for
both true and false memories (see Figure 3a). The raw recog-
nition rates in each condition were presented in the
Supplementary Materials.
We were specifically interested in comparing the effect
sizes of SRE in false memories and true memories, respective-
ly. The result showed that false recognition rates in the self-
reference condition were significantly higher than in the other-
reference condition, t(38) = 3.68, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.60.
The self-reference condition also had significantly higher false
recognition rates than the neutral condition using a one-tailed t
test, t(38) = 1.92, p = .03, Cohen’s d = 0.31. A paired-samples
t test showed significantly higher true memory rates in the
self-reference condition than in the other-reference condition
as well, t(38) = 2.02, p = .05, Cohen’s d = 0.33.
Net accuracy
Net accuracy was calculated as the ratio of true recognition to
true recognition plus false recognition (Brainerd et al., 2008a).
We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA to compare net
accuracy in the self-reference, other-reference, and neutral
conditions. No significant main effect was found on the refer-
ence variable, F(2, 76) = 0.10, p = .91. Net accuracy of the
self-reference processing (M = 0.51, 95% CI [0.47, 0.54]) did
not differ from that of the other-reference processing (M =
0.50, 95% CI [0.46, 0.55]) or the neutral condition (M =
0.51, 95% CI [0.48, 0.55]). The results suggest that self-
referencing did not increase the overall accuracy of memory
compared with other-referencing and the neutral conditions in
the DRM paradigm.
Recollection and familiarity of SR false memory
Recollection is the rate of Bremember^ responses, whereas
familiarity is calculated as the rate of^knowing^ responses
divided by 1 minus the rate of remember responses
(Knowing rate/(1 − recollection rate); Yonelinas, 2002;
Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). We conducted repeated-
measures ANOVAs to compare recollection of critical lures
in different reference conditions. As Table 1 shows, we found
that different reference conditions led to statistically different
recollection rates for critical lures, F(2, 76) = 7.24, p = .001,
partial η2 = 0.16. Follow-up Bonferroni contrasts showed that
in the self-reference condition, critical lures received statisti-
cally higher recollection scores than in the other-reference
condition, t(38) = 3.55, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.58, and neutral
conditions, t(38) = 2.97, p = .005, Cohen’s d =0.48. For fa-
miliarity, all conditions had equal levels of familiarity, F(2,
76) = 1.75, p = .18. Thus, processing information related to
oneself mainly increased false recollections relative to the
condition in which information was related to others.
Recollection and familiarity of SR true memory
We conducted the same repeated-measures ANOVAs on rec-
ollection and familiarity of true memories. We found a statis-
tical difference in recollection scores for presented items
among the reference conditions, F(2, 76) = 4.97, p = .009,
partial η2 = 0.12, while familiarity was not significantly im-
pacted by reference, F(2, 76) = 0.65, p = .52. Paired-samples t
tests showed that in the self-reference condition, presented
items had statistically higher recollection scores than in the
(a) Exp. 1 European sample (b) Exp. 2 Asian sample 
Fig. 3 True and false recognition rates in self-reference, other-reference, and neutral conditions in (a) Experiment 1 (European sample; n = 39) and (b)
Experiment 2 (East Asian sample; n = 29) (Error bars stand for 95% CIs)
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other-referenced condition, t(38) = 2.07, p = .045, Cohen’s d =
0.33, and the neutral condition, t(38) = 3.20, p = .003, Cohen’s
d = 0.51. The latter two did not differ from each other, t(38) =
0.75, p = .46. The results were consistent with previous studies
which found that self-reference increased recollections of true
memories (Leshikar et al., 2015).
In Experiment 1, we showed that in line with our hy-
pothesis, relating information to oneself increased both
true and false memories compared with relating informa-
tion to others. Moreover, we found that self-reference spe-
cifically increased recollection scores of studied items and
critical lures. These may be explained by our hypothetical
mechanism of the SRE in the associative memory network
(see Fig. 1). Because the self facilitates the relational pro-
cessing or the binding of DRM list items (Klein, 2012; Sui
& Humphreys, 2015), on the one hand, facilitated related-
ness increases the phenomenological level of activated rec-
ollection of the studied items, as demonstrated by our re-
sults and also previous SRE research (e.g., Leshikar et al.,
2015; Serbun et al., 2011). On the other hand, the increased
activation may automatically spread to critical lures (e.g.,
AAT; Howe et al., 2009), and increase the activation level
of critical lures as well. As a result, the highest proportion
of critical lures that were falsely remembered was in the
self-reference condition.
Besides relational processing, the other mechanism that
may mediate SRE is item-specific processing (or
elaboration; Klein, 2012). Item-specific processing refers to
encoding specific information of an item (Hunt & Einstein,
1981; Klein & Loftus, 1988). For example, for sound and
piano, sound can be encoded as something people hear, while
piano is an object. However, item-specific processing distin-
guishes different items, and it has been found to reduce false
memories (e.g., Arndt & Reder, 2003; Israel & Schacter,
1997; McCabe, Presmanes, Robertson, & Smith, 2004). For
instance, when DRM items within a list were presented in
different fonts, false memories were reduced compared with
when DRM items were presented in the same font (Arndt &
Reder, 2003). Our results showing that self-referencing in-
creased false memories seemed not to support item-specific
processing as the dominant processing in the current para-
digm. Moreover, if item-specific processing is the main mech-
anism of SRE here, one would expect it to increase net
accuracy as it should increase true memory but decrease false
memory, which was not the case in our results.
Surprisingly, we found that net accuracy of self-referencing
did not differ significantly from other-referencing and neutral
conditions, suggesting self-referencing does not increase the
overall memory accuracy in a paradigm where relational pro-
cessing would lead to associative memory illusions. The re-
sults showed that self-referencing increased true and false
memories to the same extent compared with the other condi-
tions, leading to no statistical difference between conditions.
These results indicate that relational processing is the domi-
nant processing in SRE with the DRM paradigm. Relational
processing results in an increase of activation of both studied
items and critical lures that share the same memory network.
Thus, Experiment 1 shows that processing information in
relation to the self elevates true and false memory levels. One
limitation with the current sample is that most participants
were female. One may also wonder that the difference be-
tween the self-reference condition and the neutral condition
on false recognition rates reached only one-tail significance.
However, we had predicted a one directional effect; that is,
self-reference increases false memory relative to the other
conditions, and our prediction was supported by the results.
Moreover, this will not hinder our conclusion on SRE as SRE
here is based on self-referencing versus other-referencing
comparisons. Another interesting observation was that net ac-
curacy was not affected by self-referencing. To examine the
reliability of this finding, we reanalyzed data from another
sample in Experiment 2, to test whether similar findings
would be found even under a different cultural background.
Specifically, in Experiment 2, a similar approach was used in
an Asian sample, and there was a neutral reference (a color
square) in the neutral condition.
Experiment 2
Self-representation is impacted by cultural context. For in-
stance, Westerners normally value the self as independent
and less connected to others while East Asians are more likely
to value the relationship between the self and others (Markus
& Kitayama, 1991). Zhu et al. (2007) found that processing
information in relation to one’s mother activated similar neural
Table 1 Recollection and familiarity of critical lures and studied items in different reference conditions (means with 95% CIs)
Reference Critical lures Studied items
Recollection Familiarity Recollection Familiarity
Self-reference 0.49 [0.40, 0.57] 0.44 [0.34, 0.55] 0.48 [0.41, 0.56] 0.42 [0.34, 0.49]
Other-reference 0.35 [0.28, 0.43] 0.36 [0.27, 0.44] 0.39 [0.32, 0.47] 0.40 [0.32, 047]
Neutral 0.35 [0.27, 0.44] 0.45 [0.35, 0.56] 0.37 [0.30, 0.44] 0.45 [0.37, 0.53]
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correlates as self-referenced processing in Asian participants
but not in Western subjects, suggesting culture shapes neural
correlates of self-representational cognitive processes. Other
research found that Eastern Asians tend to focus more on the
relationships and contexts when processing pictures such as a
lion standing in a desert background, while Westerners focus
more on the objects such as the lion (Goh et al., 2007; Nisbett
& Masuda, 2003). Data from East Asian participants were
analyzed in Experiment 2 to explore whether there was any
cultural difference in self-referenced true and false memories
as well as net accuracy in the DRM paradigm. Since East
Asians pay more attention to relationships with others, pro-
cessing information in relation to others may already show a
high level of relational processing. We predicted that East
Asians might not exhibit a self-reference false memory effect
as strong as Europeans, and thus net accuracy (i.e., true mem-




Twenty-nine participants from Fudan University, China were
tested.1 The East Asian sample consisted of 13 males and 16
females (Mage = 21.2, SD = 2.06, range: 19–26 years). All
Chinese participants were native Mandarin speakers. The
sample was part of a study in China (Zhou, Wang, & Zhou,
2014).2 We reanalyzed the data with new analyses to test our
hypotheses, and we conducted cultural comparisons across
data from the East Asian and European samples. These anal-
yses have not been reported before.
Materials
Fifteen Chinese DRM lists were translated and adapted from
Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999). The BAS of each
list was measured with a Chinese population in a pilot study
based on the procedures in Roed ige r, Watson ,
McDermott, and Gallo (2001b). Participants were first given
the Chinese words and were asked to write down the first
word it brought to mind for each word. Then the connection
strength between each study word (e.g., garage, drive, road,
Mercedes) and its corresponding critical lure (e.g., car) was
measured as the probability it elicited the critical lure. BAS
was the average probability that the studied items elicited the
critical lure. Hence, some DRM lists used in the East Asian
sample were different from that of the European sample.
Fifteen lists were pseudorandomly assigned to the self-
reference (five lists; mean BAS = 0.19, SD = .04), other-
reference (five lists; mean BAS = 0.20, SD = .04), and the
neutral condition (five lists; mean BAS = 0.20, SD = .03), with
BAS matched in the three conditions, F(2, 12) = 0.09, p = .91.
The recognition list contained 15 critical lures (one per list),
45 studied items (three items per list), and 20 unrelated items.
The studied items were from the first, sixth, and 10th position
of each list.
Design and procedure
The experiment used a 3 (reference: self vs. other vs. neutral)
× 2 (memory type: true vs. false) within-subjects design. The
procedure of Experiment 2 was identical as in Experiment 1,
except for the following differences. First, in the East Asian
sample of Experiment 2, the name BLi Ming^ (a frequently
used name in Chinese textbooks) was used in the Bother^
condition. Second, in the neutral condition of Experiment
2, a red square appeared together with DRM words. Thus,
the DRM words appeared together with either their own
name or the name BLi Ming^ or a red square in the study




The mean false recognition rate of unrelated items was 8.45%
(95%CI [4%, 13%]), whichwas statistically lower than that of
critical lures in any condition (ps < .001). We conducted a 3
(reference: self vs. other vs. neutral) × 2 (memory type: true
vs. false) repeated-measures ANOVA on true and false recog-
nition rates. The results were similar to those in Experiment 1.
The main effect of reference was statistically significant, F(2,
56) = 25.45, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.48. Bonferroni compar-
isons showed that self-reference led to higher true and false
recognition rates than both the other-reference (p < .001) and
neutral conditions (p < .001). The main effect of memory type
was not significant, F(2, 56) = 0.93, p = .34. No significant
interaction between reference and memory type was found,
either, F(2, 56) = 1.88, p = .16.
Results showed that the self-reference false memory effect
was revealed in Experiment 2 as well. Specifically, the self-
reference condition had significantly higher false memories
than the other-reference condition did, t(28) = 3.19, p =
.004, Cohen’s d = 0.61, and the neutral condition, t(28) =
2.45, p = .02, Cohen’s d = 0.46. The other-reference condition
did not differ from the neutral condition in false recognition
rates, t(28) = 0.96, p = .35. A typical SRE of true memories
was also found. A paired-samples t test showed significant
higher true memory rates in the self-reference condition than
1 Post hoc power analysis indicated that the power of Experiment 2 was 0.87
with sample size n = 29.
2 We achieved part of the data in this work, which is written in Chinese, to
conduct some new analyses.
Mem Cogn
in the other-reference condition, t(28) = 7.23, p < .001,
Cohen’s d = 1.46.
Net accuracy
Net accuracy was calculated for the self-reference, other-ref-
erence, and neutral conditions. Repeated-measures ANOVA
showed that there was no significant effect of reference on net
accuracy, F(2, 56) = 2.12, p = .13. Self-referencing (M = 0.51,
95% CI [0.49, 0.53]) resulted in similar memory net accuracy
as in the other-referencing (M = 0.48, 95% CI [0.45, 0.50])
and neutral (M = 0.50, 95% CI [0.47, 0.53]) conditions. In an
East Asian sample, it was also found that self-referencing did
not improve the overall memory accuracy with the DRM
paradigm.
Experiment 2 found comparable results in an East Asian
sample as with a European sample in Experiment 1. Besides
the difference in sample population, Experiment 2 used differ-
ent DRM lists and a different other-referenced name. However
we still found that self-referencing increased false memories
than other-referencing did and also replicated the results that
self-referencing did not impact net accuracy of memory.
Joint analyses on false memory
To explore whether the magnitude of the SR false memory
effect differed statistically in European and East Asian sam-
ples, we combined data of the two samples and treated the
sample as a between-subjects variable. A 2 (sample:
European vs. East Asian) × 2 (reference: self vs. other)
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on false recogni-
tion rates, where sample was between-subjects and reference
was within-subjects. No statistical interaction between sample
and reference was found, F(1, 66) = 0.07, p = .79, suggesting
sample did not interact with the SR false memory effect. There
was a main effect of reference, F(2, 66) = 23.50, p < .001,
partial η2= 0.26. That is, in both the European and East Asian
samples, self-referencing (M = 0.78, 95% CI [0.73, 0.83]) led
to higher false memory rates than did other-referencing (M =
0.66, 95% CI [0.62, 0.71]; p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.59). There
was also a main effect of sample. East Asian participants (M =
0.79, 95% CI [0.73, 0.86]) had statistically more false memo-
ries than European participants did (M = 0.65, 95% CI [0.60,
0.71]), F(1, 66) = 11.57, p = .001, partial η2 = 0.15.
Joint analyses on net accuracy
A 2 (sample: European vs. East Asian) × 2 (reference: self vs.
other) repeated-measures ANOVA on net accuracy was con-
ducted. No statistical interaction effect between sample and
reference was found, F(1, 66) = 0.75, p = .39. There was no
main effect of sample, F(1, 66) = 0.59, p = .44, indicating no
net accuracy differences in European (M = 0.51, 95% CI
[0.48, 0.53]) and East Asian samples (M = 0.49, 95% CI
[0.46, 0.52]). No main effect of reference was found, either,
F(1, 66) = 0.99, p = .32, suggesting self-referencing (M =
0.51, 95% CI [0.49, 0.53]) did not impact net accuracy com-
pared with other-referencing (M = 0.49, 95% CI [0.46, 0.52])
across our two samples. Although East Asian participants had
different self-referenced true and false memory rates relative
to the European sample, self-referencing had a very similar
effect on net accuracy in the two samples.
Contrary to our prediction, there was no cultural difference
in self-referenced false memories and net accuracies. To note,
there are some differences in the experimental materials be-
tween the samples, so one needs to be cautious when
interpreting the joint analyses. One difference is that the
Chinese DRM lists were different from lists used in the
European sample. The names used in the other-reference con-
ditions of the two samples were also different, which was due
to cultural difference, but maybe in future research the names
can be more strictly comparable. Another difference is the
number of items in the recognition test. Although the propor-
tions of critical lure in the recognition test were comparable
(20% vs. 19% in European and East Asian samples), the dif-
ferent number of studied items per list might impact the re-
sults. Nevertheless, the SR false memory effect is based on
within-subject comparisons between self-reference and other-
reference conditions. Those differences should not have im-
pacted the main message of the current study.
General discussion
The current study examined whether processing information
in relation to oneself (i.e., self-referencing) increased false
memories compared with processing information in relation
to others (i.e., other-referencing). In two experiments with
Eastern and Western samples, we found consistent results that
self-referencing enhanced both false recognition rates of crit-
ical lures and true recognition rates of studied items in the
DRM paradigm. Specifically, self-referencing impacted recol-
lection but not familiarity of studied items and critical lures. In
addition, we found that self-referencing did not increase the
net accuracy compared with other-referencing and neutral
conditions. The current findings support the theoretical view
that false memories are not malfunctions of cognitive process-
es (e.g., Howe, 2011; Schacter, 2012), but that true and false
memories may originate from similar memory mechanisms
such as spreading activation and gist processing.
Indeed, the current findings can be readily explained by
spreading activation theories of memory (Howe et al., 2009;
Roediger et al., 2001a), in which relational processing or bind-
ing plays a key role. In this theoretical view, nodes (e.g.,
words, images) and associative links (i.e., relations or bind-
ings) are the cognitive units of memory, and they make up the
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whole memory network (Anderson, 1983; Howe et al., 2009).
When participants process the DRM words in relation to
themselves, DRM items that share the same theme (i.e., crit-
ical lure) are more strongly linked to each other than when
DRM words are processed in relat ion to others .
Consequentially, memories for DRMwords are better retained
under self-referencing and theoretically, activation levels of
DRM items in an associative memory network is increased
by self-referencing since activation level determines memory
rates (Anderson, 1983). Thus, more activation can be spread
to related but nonpresented critical lures in a memory network,
and hence memory rates for critical lures are higher in the self-
reference condition. In short, self-referencing increases bind-
ing among concepts in a memory network, which leads to
more activation spreading along the network to critical lures
and this in turn increases false memory rates.
The SRE on both true and false memories supports fuzzy-
trace theory as well. Previous research has shown that self-
referencing improves relational processing (e.g., semantic re-
lations) of studied items (Klein, 2012). According to FTT,
semantic relations are represented as gist traces in memory
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Thus, self-referencing may boost
gist processing of studied lists. Gist traces support not only
correct recognition of studied items but also false recognition
of nonpresented but meaning-consistent critical lures (Reyna,
Corbin, Weldon, & Brainerd, 2016). As a result, self-
referencing can increase both true recognition of studied items
and false recognition of critical lures.
Based on the activation theories and FTT, we propose that
cognitive processes/factors that increase mnemonic efficiency
(by increasing relational binding among memory nodes or gist
extraction of stimuli) may increase susceptibility to associa-
tive false memories. The following evidence supports the
above proposition. First, our results here have already demon-
strated that self-referencing as a superior mnemonic process-
ing leads to high levels of false memories. Second, research
has found that deeper processing of the information (e.g., de-
fining an item), which is known to enhance true memories,
produces more false memories than shallow processing does
(e.g., counting the letters of a word; Rhodes &Anastasi, 2000;
Thapar &McDermott, 2001). Third, survival processing (e.g.,
rating items’ relevance for a survival scenario) has been found
to boost true memories (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008; Nairne,
Thompson, & Pandeirada, 2007); however, it has also been
found to increase susceptibility to memory illusions (Howe &
Derbish, 2010; Otgaar & Smeets, 2010). Fourth, individuals
with highly superior autobiographical memories, who can ac-
curately remember everyday details since midchildhood, are
found to be more susceptible to suggestive false memories
than are normally remembering adults (Patihis et al., 2013).
Other evidence has come from the development of relation-
al binding and development of false memories. The ability of
binding among stimuli develops with age. Research has found
that people’s ability to bind isolated parts of pictures improves
from childhood to adulthood (Sluzenski, Newcombe, &
Kovacs, 2006). Lee, Wendelken, Bunge, and Ghetti (2016)
have found that item–item and item–time bindings improve
gradually from 8 years of age to adulthood. Interestingly, there
is a similar developmental pattern (i.e., the development re-
versal) of false memory formation from children to adults.
That is, children exhibit fewer false memories generated from
associative lists such as DRM lists than adults do (e.g.,
Brainerd et al., 2008a; Howe et al., 2009; Otgaar, Howe,
Brackmann, & Smeets, 2016). More intriguingly, older adults
exhibit the phenomenon of hyperbinding, in which they make
too many associations (Campbell, Hasher, & Thomas, 2010),
creating more associative false memories than young adults
do (Devitt & Schacter, 2016; Schacter, Koutstaal, & Norman,
1997). Similarly, as predicted by FTT, gist sensitivity in-
creases with age, and thus false memory increases with age
(Brainerd et al., 2008a). Taken together, from a developmental
perspective, binding ability and gist extraction ability increase
with age from childhood until later adulthood, and suscepti-
bility to associative false memories increases correspondingly.
Relational binding is obviously significant for human
memory since it allows individuals to bind features of an ex-
perience into an integrated episodic memory (Eichenbaum &
Cohen, 2004), and so are self-referencing, deep processing,
and survival processing functional for human memory.
However, those cognitive functions inevitably lead to unwant-
ed false memories under certain circumstances. Thus, false
memories reflect the adaptive nature of memory in the sense
that they originate from efficient functioning of the memory
system instead of being malfunctions of the memory system
(see also Howe, 2011; Howe & Derbish, 2010; Schacter,
2012).
Contrary to our prediction, we did not find any cultural
difference in the SR false memory effect and net accuracy.
This suggests that the SRE on true and false memories is not
sensitive to cultures and may represent a universal memory
mechanism. One possible explanation is that spreading acti-
vation in a memory network is automatic (Howe, 2005, 2006;
Howe et al., 2009; Roediger et al., 2001a) and thus not im-
pacted by cultural backgrounds. The automaticity of memory
activations implies that activations of critical lures cannot be
controlled by consciousness, such as consciously making ref-
erences to others. Another reason why we did not find a cul-
tural difference may be due to the identity of others used in the
other-reference condition. Both BTrump^ and BLiMing^were
familiar, but not intimate others for our participants. Zhu et al.
(2007) have found that when East Asians make references to
their mothers, a similar neural pattern as SREwas found. If we
use participants’ mothers in the other-reference condition in
European and East Asian samples, we may find a cultural
difference on SR false memories. Further research is needed
regarding cultural difference on SRE.
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In conclusion, we found a self-reference false memory ef-
fect that processing information in relation to oneself led to
more false memories than processing information in relation
to others (e.g., Trump). The SR false memory effect was stable
acrossWestern and Eastern population samples, with identical
effect sizes, Cohen’s d around 0.6. What’s more, self-
referencing did not increase memory net accuracy across
two samples. Based on spreading activation theories of mem-
ory, we propose that cognitive processes/factors that increase
mnemonic efficiency may increase susceptibility to associa-
tive false memories, which reflects the adaptive nature of
memory.
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